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The effectiveness of the legal system has a crucial impact on a country's business prospects and has a 
direct impact on international society’s confidence in that country.4 Thus, it is of great benefit to 
China, which is rapidly becoming one of the world’s largest economies,5 to establish and maintain an 
effective legal system to assist in the sustainable growth of its economy. Due to the poor practice and 
apparent lack of integrity in China’s listed companies, establishing a streamlined legal framework 
capable of deterring directors from abusing their power and promoting directors’ stewardship6 of the 
company has become a pressing issue in China. Nevertheless, a double agency costs problem and the 
unique Guanxi tradition in China have made the regulation of director behaviour a particularly 
onerous task for China’s regulators.   
 
The necessity to improve integrity in the marketplace 
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4 See Phil Burns and Christoph Riechmann, Regulatory Instruments and their Effects on Investment Behavior (World Bank 
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49. 
 
It is argued that in China, multiple market participants (such as listed companies, financial 
intermediaries, relevant professionals including accountants and law firms, institutional investors, and 
even individual investors) collude in making excessive profits. As one of the main participants in 
financial markets, listed companies have dented the confidence of investors in China. Li provided a 
survey of listed companies’ creditability. Of over 100 randomly selected individual investors he 
interviewed at one local branch of a securities company, only 26 expressed any confidence in listed 
companies, especially their accounting statements and other relevant disclosed information, while 33 
demurred and 44 investors were sceptical. This seems to lead to the obvious conclusion that the 
overwhelming majority of investors in China’s financial markets regard listed companies, or at least 
some of them, as untrustworthy.7 One of the reasons that investors distrust listed companies is the 
companies’ poor practice and apparent lack of integrity. There is a perception that many listed 
companies in China actively engage in activities which may not always be lawful or proper. They 
may, for example, engage in the so-called ‘technical treatment’ of disclosure by taking advantage of 
loopholes in accounting regulations that deliberately delay the disclosure of information. One of the 
most recent examples is the April 2019 Kangmei Xinkaihe Pharmaceutical accounting scandal where 
Kangmei Xinkaihe Pharmaceutical announced an ‘accounting mistake’ of the historical amount of 30 
billion RMB (equivalent to 3.43 billion GBP). 8 In other cases, the listed company simply 
misrepresents or falsifies information which would significantly affect the market prices of their 
securities, for example, announcing anticipated gains in the reports of the first quarter while the 
annual reports reveal massive losses. 
 
The stability and integrity of financial markets are interconnected. In order to achieve financial 
stability, which enables efficient resource allocation and proper risk transference, it is vital to ensure 
that no financial institution is able to affect the market price dishonestly. Nor should any speculator be 
able to exert influence on the price that makes it move away from the values supported by rational 
economic fundamentals.9 All of the above can, to some degree, be achieved by imposing integrity 
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9 The Reserve Bank, The Impact of Hedge Funds on Financial Markets (Paper submitted to House of Representatives Standing 
obligations on market participants, more specifically, the directors of the market participants. In 
China, imposing integrity obligations on directors is particularly difficult because of the existence of 
the double agency costs problem and the Guanxi tradition.  
 
Double agency costs in China 
 
In 1932, Berle and Means in Modern Corporation and Private Property documented a phenomenon of 
separate ownership and control of public corporations. They argued that in modern corporations, the 
two attributes of ownership (control and economic rights) are no longer attached to the same individual 
or group: ‘The stockholder has surrendered control over his wealth’.10  Because ownership of the 
company is widely dispersed among the shareholders, the problem of collective action and the issue of 
rational apathy make it difficult for the dispersed shareholders to coordinate their activities. Thus, 
management has a strong incentive to increase the number of shares, not only because to do so increases 
the available capital and helps transferability by keeping the prices of individual shares comparatively 
low, but also because increasing the number of shares reduces the incentive and ability of each 
shareholder to gather information and monitor the performance of the firm effectively.11 Every step that 
weakens the monitoring power of shareholders potentially enhances the authority of the board of 
directors. However, Berle and Means suggested that the board of directors should be regarded merely 
as agents.12  
 
The theory regarding the separation of ownership and control is on the threshold of the principal-agent 
model of the firm.13 Agency theory argues that when the directors have a conflict of interests with the 
corporation and the shareholders, the directors tend to sacrifice the interests of the corporation and 
shareholders in favour of their own interests. The argument echoes Adam Smith’s suspicious opinion 
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of top managers.14 The information asymmetry existing between the management as ‘insiders’ and the 
everyday shareholders, in particular, minority shareholders, and stakeholders as ‘outsiders’ makes it 
easier for the management to generate benefits against the shareholders' interests from the agent-
principal relationship.15 The costs resulting from the agent-principal relationship and the information 
asymmetry are called agency costs. The agency problem exists in three ways: between the shareholders 
as principals and managers as agents, between the majority shareholder and minority shareholders, and 
between the firm itself and other stake holders.16 
  
If there are multiple principals, and these principals belong to different interest groups, extra effort has 
to be made for the principals to act collectively. These are called coordination costs.17 The agency 
problem will be amplified in situations where coordination costs are heavy.18  
 
It is more important for countries with concentrated share structures, such as China, to enhance directors’ 
fiduciary duties and discipline directors’ conduct because the agency problem in these countries tends 
to be more severe than in countries with dispersed share structures. This is because those countries with 
a concentrated share ownership structure are more likely to have to deal with the ‘double agency costs’ 
that exist between shareholders and managers and between the majority shareholders and the minority 
shareholders. In addition, the minority shareholders may suffer from collusion between the directors 
and the majority shareholders. Coordination costs are high, and the double agency problem creates 
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the agents can exploit. 
additional challenges for the legislators and policy makers when producing regulations on directors’ 
integrities and fiduciary duties in China. 
 
The tradition of Guanxi 
 
Another significant factor challenging the integrity of company directors in China is the traditional 
culture of Guanxi. In the 2013 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, China ranked 
80 out of 180 countries, thus showing that China is perceived as highly corrupt.19 China has a well-
known business culture that favours cooperation with family members and close friends (Guanxi).20 
Company directors are pressurised into finding ways to use Guanxi to establish, develop, and expand 
their business in China. This promotes the use of bribery. Gradually, bribery evolves into ‘trade usage’ 
in certain industries in China whereby it becomes impossible to operate without giving money or 
gifts. It is especially harmful for those multinational companies that have strong business ethics in 
their home countries; it is either too remote for the headquarters to control the subsidiaries in China, 
or the headquarters must choose to ignore the problems in the subsidiary. Further, the strong 
governmental bureaucratic control over directors in public-listed companies21 exacerbates the 
situation. The Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK) case in September 2014 is a classic case of corruption in the 
Chinese operations of a multinational company. The British pharmaceuticals company GSK 
systematically bribed doctors in China. As a result, the company was fined £297m for bribery by the 
Chinese authorities, and Mark Reilly, the CEO for GSK’s China operations, was given a three-year 
suspended prison sentence.22 Thus, it is the legislators’ task to examine how the law should empower 
company directors to maintain business integrity and how the law could protect the directors’ right to 
conduct business in an ethical manner.  
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The emerging legal framework  
 
Following a civil law tradition, directors’ integrity and business ethic requirements are set out in the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 2014 (CCL 2014) and the Guidelines for Articles of 
Association of Listed Companies 2006 (amended in 2014). Article 5 of the CCL 2014 is the main 
provision regulating directors’ integrity in China. Article 5 imposes ethical requirements on companies 
by requiring a company to abide by the laws and administrative regulations, observe social morals and 
business ethics, act with integrity and in good faith, accept the regulation of the government and the 
public, and undertake social responsibilities when engaging in business activities.23 Thus, as the agent 
of a company, the board of directors is responsible for observing social, moral, and business ethics; 
acting with integrity and in good faith; and undertaking social responsibilities.   
 
However, the enforcement of Article 5 has not been an easy task. It is argued that the two-tier board 
system adopted in China, that is, the independent director system and employee participation system, 
will dilute the managerial power of directors 24  and consequently, reduce directors’ authority and 
capability to enforce Article 5. Also, unlike in common law countries, the fiduciary duties of directors 
in China are specified in codified black letter law leaving no scope for any flexible interpretation in 
terms of the content of directors’ integrity. Indeed, it has long been argued that the minimal respect for 
and ineffective enforcement of the law are the main reasons for China falling behind in the legal system 
with respect to environmental problems, labour protection, and other social issues.25 
 
Regarding directors’ fiduciary duties, the regulation on directors’ fiduciary duties dates back to as early 
as 1994 when the first Chinese Company Law 1994 (CCL 1994) was enacted. The legislation was 
prepared and produced in the wider context of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political will to 
establish a modern corporate system. The Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Chinese Communist 
Party National Congress was held in Beijing in November 1993, and it passed a Central Committee 
                                                             
23 Article 5 of the CCL 2006 
24 Jingchen Zhao, Corporate Social Responsibility in Contemporary China (Edward Elgar 2014) 142. 
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Resolution on Several Issues Regarding Building a Socialist Market Economy. The aim of the Congress 
was to establish a socialist market economy through reforming the management mechanism of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) and establishing a modern enterprise system that is adaptive to market needs, 
clear in property rights, clear in the separation between government and enterprises, and scientific in 
management.26 To achieve this goal, many corporate laws, including the CCL 1994, were produced. 
These laws focused on various aspects of the corporate governance mechanism, including directors’ 
integrity and fiduciary duties.27 Directors’ integrity was vaguely stated in Article 14 of the CCL 1994: 
‘Companies must comply with the law, conform to business ethics, strengthen the construction of the 
socialist civilization and subject themselves to the Government and public supervisions in the course 
of their business.’28 Further amendments to corporate and securities regulations took place in 2006. 
Provisions on directors’ integrity and fiduciary duties were greatly refined and enhanced in aspects such 
as the balance between directors’ responsibility and the reasonable protection of directors. 29  The 
Chinese Company Law was further amended in 2014 (CCL 2014), but no amendments were made to 
directors’ duties. The changes mainly concerned a looser supervisory regime on registered capital and 
the changing role of the government in the supervision of corporations.30  
 
Chapter 6 of CCL 2014 focused on the qualifications and obligations of the directors, supervisors, and 
senior managers of a company. Key provisions regarding directors’ fiduciary duties are found in Article 
148, where directors are required to assume the duty of loyalty and duty of care to the company. Articles 
149 to 150 impose a series of specific duties on directors, including a duty of good faith, a duty of care, 
a duty not to misappropriate company assets, a duty to disclose, a duty to maintain secrecy, a duty to 
compensate the company for any breach of duty, a duty not to be involved in a competing business, and 
a duty not to deal fraudulently with the assets of the company.31 All earnings obtained by the directors 
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27 Article 1 of the CCL 1994 
28 Article 14 of the CCL 1994  
29 J. V. Feinerman, ‘New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?’ (2007) 191 China Quarterly 590. 
30 Anjie Jiang, ‘Understanding and Considering the Reform on Corporate Capital System in Company Law – Interview with 
Professor Xudong Zhao, China University of Political Sciences’ (2014) 3 Legal Daily. See 
<http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/2014-03/26/content_5399256.htm?node=25498> accessed on 21 May 2019. 
31 Article 1 of the CCL 2014  
or senior managers in violation of the provisions in the preceding paragraph must be returned to the 
company.32  
 
Shortcomings in the provisions relating to directors’ fiduciary duties in CCL 2006 were soon identified 
and were addressed in CCL 2014. The first was the existence of conflicting provisions.33 For instance, 
Article 1 of the CCL 2006 stressed the importance of promoting a ‘socialist market economy’, which 
suggested that for the directors, the political agenda eclipses economic aspirations, whilst Article 5 of 
the CCL 2006 stipulates that the directors owe fiduciary duties to the stakeholders and must act in line 
with both social morality and business morality.34 These provisions add to the legal uncertainty in the 
ultimate question of to whom directors should be accountable.35  
 
Secondly, many provisions were lacking in detail. For instance, according to CCL 2006, the directors 
owed a duty to not be involved in a competing business. However, the provision did not address the 
issue of the duration of such a duty. Accordingly, confusion arose on issues such as whether a director 
would owe this duty after his or her resignation. Another good example would be the provision in 
relation to directors’ duty to compensate the company when the company has suffered a loss due to 
directors’ breach of laws and regulations. In addition, there were no follow-up provisions addressing 
technical issues, such as the calculation of the loss caused and the compensation methods and 
compensation time frame of the loss.36 
 
Thirdly, it had been widely acknowledged that in China, the government intentionally drafted the laws 
were in broad terms so that they could be implemented flexibly according to diverse local conditions in 
a fast changing era.37   This was echoed in the CCL 2006 provisions on directors’ duties. Those 
                                                             
32 Article 149 of the CCL 2014  
33 K.L. Alex Lau, ‘The Chinese Limited Liability Company under the New Company Law’ (2006) 36(3) Hong Kong Law 
Journal 633. 
34 See Article 97 and Article 98 of the Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 2006  
35 Angus Young, ‘Conceptualizing a Chinese Corporate Governance Framework: Tensions between Tradition, Ideologies and 
Modernity’ (2009) 20(7) International Company and Commercial Law Review 235 -244. 
36 Guangdong Xu, Tianshu Zhou, Bin Zeng and Jin Shi ‘Directors Duties in China’ (2013) 14 European Business Organisation 
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37 S. Lubman, ‘Birds in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years’ (2000) 20 Northwest Journal of International Law 
provisions, however, were criticised as being too abstract, as this created difficulties in legal practice. 
38 For instance, the provisions imposed the duty of diligence on directors, supervisors, and senior 
managers without specifying how the duty should be applied to each category of leadership.39 Indeed, 
there have been intense discussions on the difficulty regarding the codification of directors’ fiduciary 
duties in a civil law environment.40 The difficulty in implementing directors’ duties, a concept that 
originated in a common law background, commonly exists in a civil law country in emerging markets 
with transplanted hybrid legal systems. 
 
Stricter rules apply to directors in public listed companies due the profound economic and social impact 
of public companies in the financial and securities market and beyond. Further liabilities were not 
imposed on directors by the Security Law of PRC but rather were stipulated in the department 
regulations of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the watchdog for China’s 
securities market, notably, the Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 2006 
(amended in 2014). This reflects the strong pro-administration characteristic in China’s legal 
framework.41 The Guidelines echo CCL 2006 and stipulate directors’ duty of loyalty in Article 97 and 
duty of care to the company in Article 98. In particular, the Guidelines further introduced directors’ duty 
on equal treatment of all shareholders and reinforced directors’ duty on the genuine disclosure of 
company information. Directors’ fiduciary duties are also mentioned in the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies 2002. According to Article 33 of the Code, directors shall ‘faithfully, 
honestly, and diligently perform their duties in the best interests of the company and all the 
shareholders’. 42 However, because of the self-regulatory nature of the Code, there is a prepositional 
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(2010)  3 Securities Law Review 372. 
39  Guangdong Xu, Tianshu Zhou, Bin Zeng and Jin Shi, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’ (2013) 14 European Business 
Organisation Law Review 61. 
40 R. Clark, Corporate Law (Little, Brown & Company 1986) 141; K. Pistor and C. Xu ‘Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil 
Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incomplete Law’ in C.J. Milhaupt (ed.), Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate 
Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deal (Columbia University Press 2003) 77. 
L.A. Hamermesh, ‘The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 1777. 
 
42 Article 33 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 2002. 
procedure for imposing any sanctions on the directors according to the Code. The listed company will 
be obliged to comply with the Code only if it has previously been given an administrative sanction by 
the CSRC. The legal deterrence of the Code is substantially reduced due to the prepositional procedure. 
 
According to CCL 2014, directors must act in accordance with their fiduciary duties in the ordinary 
course of business and when passing company resolutions. First of all, directors are answerable for their 
own conduct. Where a director breaches any laws or administrative regulations or the company’s 
articles of association when performing his or her duties for the company, and causes losses to the 
company, the director will be obliged to compensate the company.43 Secondly, directors are responsible 
for the resolutions passed by the board of directors. In the event of directors’ duty of loyalty and duty 
of care being breached by the board passing a resolution which is in breach of the laws, administrative 
regulations, the company's articles of association, or the resolutions of the shareholders’ general meeting, 
and the company suffers serious losses as a consequence, the directors participating in the adoption of 
such a resolution shall be liable to pay compensation to the company. 44 
 
Directors in China may be prosecuted for criminal offences if they commit financial crimes, such as 
insider dealing45 , the crime of appropriation46 , money laundering47 , market abuse48 , bribery49 , etc. 
However, under those circumstances, directors are subject to criminal sanctions because they are in 
breach of criminal law but not because they are in breach of company law. 
 
Directors’ compliance with the above laws and regulations is subject to internal and external supervision. 
                                                             
43 Article 150 of the CCL 2014.  
44 Article 113(3) of the CCL 2014.  
45 Insider dealings may also trigger a criminal offence. The Criminal Law 1999 was amended in 2009. Article 180(1) of the 
Criminal Law 2009 stipulates (as amended) that ‘for insider trading that has a material effect on the transaction price of 
securities or futures. If the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment not more than five years 
or criminal detention, and/or be fined 1 to 5 times the illegal gains; or if the circumstances are extremely serious, shall be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment not less than five years but not more than ten years, and be fined 1 to 5 times the illegal 
gains’. 
46 Article 271 of the Criminal Law 2009.  
47 Article 191 of the Criminal Law 2009 stipulates sanctions on criminal offence on money laundry.  
48 Article 182 of the Criminal Law 2009 deals with manipulation of securities and future trading. 
49 Article 390 of the Criminal Law 2009 deals with criminal offence in relation to bribery.   
Internally, the legality of the conduct of directors and the resolutions passed by them are subject to the 
supervision of the board of supervisors50 and the independent directors51. Externally, directors’ conduct 
is monitored by various governmental agencies52, the general public (whistle blower), the media etc. 
 
The board of directors is under the watch of the board of supervisors by law in China. Thus, directors 
must provide truthful information on any data the board of supervisors might request and are prohibited 
from impeding the board of supervisors in the exercise of their legitimate power to supervise the 
operation of the company.53 In public listed companies in China, directors’ compliance with their 
fiduciary duties is further subject to monitoring by independent directors. A system of independent 
directors was introduced in 2001 by the CSRC through the Guidance on the Establishment of a System 
of Independent Directors in Public Listed Companies; the system of independent directors was 
stipulated in Article 123 CCL 2006.54 Further guidance on the Indecent Directors’ Performance of 
Duties was produced for independent directors on how to exercise their power in 2012 by the China 
Association for Public Companies, in the hope of promoting better corporate governance in listed 
companies in China. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of independent directors in China are not without 
flaws. Due to the ambiguity in the nature of independent directors,55 independent directors in China act 
more like management consultants than independent monitors. The independence of such directors is 
often questioned because the majority shareholders constantly nominate their ‘insiders’ as independent 
directors. Further, current regulations on independent directors are found to be only loosely set out in 
the CSRC administrative rules and the self-regulatory rules of the two stock exchanges. There is a lack 
                                                             
50 Article 151 of the CCL 2014 stipulates directors’ duties to the board of supervisors. ‘Directors must provide truthful 
information and data requested by the board of supervisors should they request it. Directors are prohibited from impeding the 
board of supervisors from exercising their legitimate power to supervisor the operation of the company’. 
51 According to CCL2014 Article 123, a listed company shall appoint independent directors. The specific measures in this 
regard shall be formulated by the State Council. 
52  E.g. The CSRC, for instance. Directors’ compliance on environmental regulations is supervised by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection. 
53 Article 150 of the CCL 2014.  
54 Article 123 of the CCL 2014.  
55 Niu Yuan, ‘A brief analysis of the defects and countermeasures of the independent director system in China’ (2009) 51(4) 
International Journal of Law and Management 261. 
of systematic and streamlined rules on the system of independent directors, in particular, rules on the 
accountability and disqualification of independent directors.56 At an institutional level, the co-existence 
of a two-tier-board system and independent director system increases transaction costs and may cause 




In China, the enforcement of regulations regarding directors’ fiduciary duties is achieved mainly by 
private enforcement. Where a director’s breach of their fiduciary duties results in a loss for the company, 
the shareholders can either request that the board of supervisors take the director in question to court, 
or they can take a derivative action against the director in question if the board of directors refuses to 
take legal action on behalf of the shareholders. The shareholders are also eligible to bring a derivative 
action in the event of an emergency where irreparable loss might occur.58 Thus, where the director in 
breach of fiduciary duties causes a loss to the shareholders, the shareholders are entitled to take direct 
legal action against the director in question in his or her own name after going through a prepositional 
procedure. 59  Although there had been reported cases on derivative actions prior to CCL 2006, 
derivative action was not codified until CCL 2006.60 However, since 2006, there has been a growing 
will from shareholders to utilise derivative actions as a private enforcement mechanism. Indeed, there 
has been a noticeable increase in the number of attempts to take directors to court with derivative actions 
for breaching their fiduciary duties. Research has shown that among the 79 derivative actions that took 
place between 2000 and 2010, 19 of those occurred prior to 2006 while 60 took place after 2006. 61 
 
                                                             
56 Gang Xiao: Strengthen Independent Directors’ Role in Corporate Governance in Public listed Companies   available at   
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-09/15/c_126985571.htm > accessed 21 May 2019. 
57 Wei, Yuwa, ‘Directors' Duties Under Chinese Law: A Comparative Revie’ (2006) 3 UNELJ 36-37. 
58 Art152 of CCL 2006. 
59 Art 153 of CCL 2006. 
60 Dan Wang, Corporate derivative actions – theoretical basis and institutional structure’ (China Legal Publishing House 2012) 
8. 
61 ibid 317. 
The prepositional procedure, nevertheless, becomes a blockage which may reduce shareholders’ 
incentives to bring derivative actions. Under the current regime, a shareholder needs to meet the criteria 
regarding the percentage of shares he or she holds and the duration of his or her shareholding. Thus, 
there is a strict limitation on which shareholders can bring derivative actions. Such strict criteria greatly 
limit minority shareholders’ ability to bring derivative actions in China. The law also does not specify 
the eligibility of special categories of shareholders, such as shadow shareholders, shareholders with no 
voting rights, or holders of preferred shares, in bringing derivative actions. 62 Another blockage for 
shareholders in bringing derivative actions is the lack of compensation of legal fees in derivative action 
legal proceedings. Shareholders cannot be compensated for the legal costs of bringing a derivative 
lawsuit, whilst the beneficiaries in these proceeds are not the shareholders but the company.63 In practice, 
due to the lack of detailed rules regarding derivative actions, the judges face several dilemmas when 
applying the law. Strict compliance with the black letter law may result in a rigid and over-conservative 
application. However, a flexible and creative application of the law brings the danger of the ‘judge 
making the law’, which is forbidden in a civil law country like China.64  
 
Shareholders in the public listed companies may experience further difficulties in bringing derivative 
actions due to the hierarchy in the force of law.  According to the Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Legislation (hereafter Law on Legislation), in China’s legal system, various laws and regulations 
have various degrees of force under the law. The Constitution has the supreme force of the law.65 This 
is superior to that of administrative regulations, local regulations, and the rules of local governments. 
In turn, the force of administrative regulations is superior to that of local regulations and the rules of 
local governments66 while finally, the rules of departments and local governments have equal force.67 
Hence, the force of administrative regulations is superior to that of the rules of departments. The Code 
of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies as a regulation of the CSRC is categorised as one of 
the rules of departments, so its force is accordingly weaker than that of administrative regulations. 
Consequently, it does not fall into the aforesaid class of regulations, which could lead to derivative 
actions if breached. Therefore, if a director is in breach of the Measure, the shareholders will not be 
able to bring a derivative action, as derivative actions can only be brought when a director’s breach is 
in breach of the laws, administrative regulations, or articles of association according to CCL 2006. In 
other words, only when the director is in breach of the laws, administrative regulations, or articles of 
                                                             
62 ibid 164, 165. 
63 Zhengfeng Lu, A Study on Shareholder Legal Action (People’s Court Press 2013) 172. 
64 supra n.61, at 8-9. 
65 Article 78 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation 2000.  
66 Article 79 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation 2000. 
67 Article 82 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation 2000. 
association of the listed companies might the shareholders be eligible to bring a derivative action.  
 
As a complementary enforcement mechanism, public enforcement is also crucial in ensuring directors’ 
fulfilment of their duties under the relevant legislation in China. Where public listed companies are 
involved, the CSRC, as the supervisory body for the securities market in China, will take steps to 
intervene. Examination of the enforcement output and enforcement input is often adopted as one of the 
key methods to measure the effectiveness of legal enforcement. 68 This, however, is based on the 
presumption that the regulator is independent and accountable to the investors.69 The independence and 
accountability of the regulators in China’s securities market have been called into question due to recent 
insider dealing and corruption scandals involving CSRC officials.  
 
The regulation of directors’ duties in listed companies reflects the strong pro-administration 
characteristic of Chinese legislation. The implementation of the provisions largely depends on the 
discretion of bureaucrats. However, while broad bureaucratic discretion does not mean it is inefficient, 
bureaucratic discretion needs to be exercised according to the legal principles set out in the legislation 
and within the scope of the authority delegated to the CSRC. It is essential to ensure that the CSRC as 
a whole exercises administrative discretion within the authority delegated to it by the State Council 
according to the legal principles set out in the laws and administrative regulations. The CSRC must be 
careful in exercising its discretion and not crowd out investors’ incentive for seeking compensation 
through private litigation, as the legal deterrence of market offenders does not compensate the investors. 
 
In terms of the efficacy of public enforcement in the securities market, the CSRC has been reluctant to 
admit that its efficiency in enforcement, regarding both the investigation and the decision-making 
process, can be improved. It has identified the lack of resources, both in respect of experienced staffing 
and adequate funding, as a fundamental reason for this unsatisfactory level of enforcement. By mid-
2012, they had a staff of only about 20 and 140, respectively, which was clearly inadequate in view of 
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the population of investors in China’s securities and futures markets, which exceeded 1 billion in 2012. 
 
The CSRC, as the primary regulator of China’s securities industry, has undertaken a series of reforms 
in recent years in order to perform its regulatory and supervisory obligations. However, it is not 
without its deficiencies. One fundamental problem that needs to be addressed is that of clarifying the 
authority of the CSRC within the Chinese legal system. Despite acting as such a regulator, the 
authority of the CSRC has never been clearly defined in the basic securities laws. It is of the greatest 
importance to amend the establishing law, that is, the Securities Law 2005 (SL 2005 hereafter) 
explicitly to authorise the CSRC to be the securities regulator. Without this, there will always be 
issues of legitimacy and constitutionality that may open the door to political issues. Another problem 
requiring amendment is the ambiguous status of the CSRC. The CSRC has been set up as a 
ministerial-level public institution, but it is not an administrative organ, according to the State Council 
(SC hereafter), which reduces its authority for issuing relevant regulations and rules. Thus, the SC 
should elevate the status of the CSRC to a ministry as soon as possible.  
 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), and the Securities 
Association of China (SAC) have been viewed as the self-regulatory organisations that monitor the 
securities markets and their members and thereby assist the CSRC to address market misconducts. 
Nonetheless, despite the legitimate authorisations given to the stock exchanges and to the SAC as a 
self-regulatory organisation, there has been increasing criticism concerning the limited roles they have 
played in ensuring the markets are fair, orderly, and efficient. The securities markets, traditionally, 
have been subject to excessive governmental regulation, which has not allowed them to build a 
tradition of self-discipline. Although the stock exchanges rarely take disciplinary actions against 
members and member companies according to the rules or listing requirements, they make referrals to 
the CSRC for further action. Both the SSE and SZSE, moreover, are administratively subordinate to 
the CSRC, and their presidents are directly appointed by the CSRC. The SAC and its local branches 
are registered as public institutions with limited self-disciplinary powers. As a result, the roles of both 
the stock exchanges and the SAC are too narrow for them to act as effectively as they should. 
 
Like many developing countries 70  China has encountered a major systematic problem, namely, 
corruption, which is generally condemned as one of the most notorious obstacles hindering China’s 
development. Indeed, the CSRC, as the watchdog of the securities market, has experienced many 
corruption-related scandals. For example, Gang Yao, a former vice chairman of the CSRC, was 
sentenced to 18 years for corruption in 2015,71 while more recently, in May 2019, the former chairman 
of the CSRC, Shiyu Liu, was reported to have turned himself in to the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection.72 However, corruption and a lack of integrity are found not only in isolated cases: 
they are known to be prevalent in all societies. Due to their detrimental effect upon democracy, equality, 
the rule of law, and economic efficiency, they particularly jeopardise those developing countries, like 
China, which have been through a transitional period.73  
 
Concluding remarks  
 
The paper examined the laws and regulations governing the integrity and duty of company directors in 
contemporary China. It considered general issues, such as the need to regulate directors in China due 
to China’s problem of double agency costs as well as the traditional Chinese culture of Guanxi, the 
establishment and recent development of relevant laws and regulations in China, the flaws inherent in 
the legislation, and how the supervisory and enforcement mechanism directly and indirectly leads to 
non-compliance. Notable achievements have been made in regulating directors’ integrity in China; a 
comprehensive and complete legislative framework covering directors’ ethical standards and a wide 
range of directors’ fiduciary duties in private and public companies has been established. Ancillary 
governmental regulations have also been produced to facilitate regulating more specialised areas not 
covered by CCL 2014, such as directors’ duties in public listed companies. A supervisory mechanism 
monitoring directors’ compliance with the relevant laws and regulations, enabling the wide participation 
and deep engagement of internal and external monitors, has been established. Private and public 
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enforcement procedures have also been developed to provide a means of sanctioning non-compliance 
and claiming for damages and compensation resulting from non-compliance. Given that the first 
Company Law in PRC had not been enacted until 1994, regulating directors’ behaviour in China is still 
at the early stage of development. Therefore, legislators and implementers still face various difficulties, 
for instance, the problem inherent in transplanting abstractly worded Anglo Saxon common law 
corporate governance legislation into a German-French civil law system where there are no precedents 
to provide guidance on the identification and treatment of violation. Establishing a sound court system 
for private enforcement and enhancing the integrity of the supervisory governmental agency are also 
vital issues to be considered in the compliance side of the law. To conclude, the laws regulating directors’ 
integrity and duty in China are a work in progress and are far from mature. There is a series of theoretical 
and practical problems to be studied and steps to be taken to improve and perfect the law.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
